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Abstract 
This thesis offers new insight into the effects of wage bargaining centralization and income 
inequality on the extent of Dutch disease in developed countries. A fixed effects panel regression 
was run for 31 OECD countries over the period 1995-2014. Four different parameters of Dutch 
disease were used as dependent variables for this analysis: manufacturing performance, real 
exchange rate, wage rates and manufacturing employment. In contrast to earlier work, which found 
a significant effect of wage coordination and income equality on these parameters, the evidence 
presented in this paper exhibits a less clear-cut effect. Wage bargaining centralization was only 
found to affect the real exchange rate. Likewise, inequality was found to only strongly affect wage 
rates. Inequality also seems to have a conditioning effect on manufacturing performance and 
exchange rates, although this evidence remains indefinite. As such, I conclude that the 
conditioning effect of wage bargaining centralization and income equality on Dutch disease does 
not universally hold. It is unlikely that this difference in outcome is only due to the inclusion of 
different countries; when regressing only for the countries used in earlier panels, the results change 
little. Rather, it seems that the conditioning effect of wage coordination and inequality on Dutch 
disease has decreased in recent years.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Countries with few natural resources have in the last century consistently outperformed 
countries with an abundancy of them. On the one hand countries with very little natural resources, 
like Switzerland and Singapore have risen from being poor countries to being some of the riches 
countries on the planet. Venezuela, on the other hand, earns billions of dollars a year selling oil, 
but more than 30% of its population lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, 
the country faces immense unemployment figures and a contracting economy at the time of 
writing. However, this phenomenon need not always take on such severe forms: developed 
countries like Australia have also been found to be suffering from decreased growth due to 
resource abundance (Hart, 2010; Koitsiwe and Adachi,2015). Indeed, although the notion of a 
‘resource curse’ seems counterintuitive, extensive evidence has been found for this phenomenon 
(most notably Sachs and Warner, 1995). People have long been fascinated by these issues: early 
observations of this phenomenon date back to the 16th century (see for example Bodin [1576/1955], 
who noted that citizens of well-endowed lands were more likely to be lazy and less industrious, p. 
161). In more recent years, several theories have been formulated to explain how windfall resource 
revenues distort economic growth. Although most of these theories focus on the obstacles for 
growth in developing countries, one theory has sought to explain the negative effects of resources 
in developed countries. This ‘Dutch disease’ hypothesis is the main subject of this thesis. It 
explains how windfall revenues from resource industries hurt long-term national growth through 
undermining industrial capacity, a process that will be described later in this thesis.   
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Evidence of this disease has been found in many countries around the world. However, a 
number of countries seem to have escaped the disease and have turned their resources into the 
basis for impressive economic growth. Norway, for example, has used its oil reserves to become 
one of the most prosperous countries in the world and has consistently outperformed its 
neighboring countries in terms of economic growth. Quite to the contrary of Canada, which has 
recently been diagnosed with Dutch disease (Beine, Bos and Coulombe, 2012; Papyrakis and 
Raveh, 2014; Shakeri, Gray and Leonard, 2012). The differences between natural resource effects 
on economic growth in rich countries has not gone unnoticed by scholars, who have sought to 
account for the differences in outcomes by extending the Dutch disease model (see for example 
van der Ploeg, 2011; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008 or Larsen, 2006). Indeed, they have sought 
other variables that may affect Dutch disease mechanisms and alleviate or worsen the symptoms. 
Some authors studying Dutch disease in developing countries have pointed out that the quality of 
economic and political institutions affects the extent of Dutch disease (van der Ploeg (2011; 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). However, developed countries all have these ‘good’ 
institutions, making overall institutional quality a bad predictor of Dutch disease severity in 
developed countries. 
 Therefore, several authors have made an attempt towards unravelling exactly which 
institutions condition the effects of Dutch disease in these countries. Bunte (2017) has recently 
made an important and promising contribution to this debate. He finds that in countries where 
wage bargaining centralization and income equality are high, Dutch disease effects are limited. 
Hence, these variables may explain some of the divergence observed in developed countries. This 
thesis will attempt to extend on the theoretical and empirical groundwork laid by Bunte (2017). In 
other words, I attempt to establish whether these results are generalizable to a larger sample of 
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developed countries, and whether inequality and centralized wage bargaining truly affect Dutch 
disease in developed countries. As such, the added value of this paper is mostly empirical, and at 
times theoretical. I use a different, and larger, sample of more developed countries for an increased 
time span. Moreover, I use different operationalizations of some of the main variables and include 
a new dependent variable as a parameter of Dutch disease. Therefore, the structure of this paper 
will be as follows. First, I present an overview of the existing debate surrounding Dutch disease, 
specifically highlighting the labor market effects left relatively undescribed by Bunte (2017). 
Thereafter, I discuss some extensions to the model and explain how wage bargaining centralization 
and (in)equality tie into the overall model of Dutch disease. This presents a number of hypotheses 
which are explained in detail. Afterwards, I discuss the applied methods and data to prepare for 
statistical analysis. I use 9 different dependent variables that serve as parameters of the disease, 
and estimate the effects on them caused by centralized wage bargaining and equality, as well as 
their interaction variables with a measure of resource rents. The results of these estimates are then 
discussed and, finally, I explain the implications of the results for future scholarship.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The resource curse 
The ‘resource curse’ is a widely-known term amongst economists. It refers to the (perhaps 
counterintuitive) phenomenon that countries with large deposits of natural resources experience 
lower growth rates than those without. Extensive empirical research has been conducted into this 
paradox, mostly originating in the 1980’s. Nankani (1980) was one of the first to use cross-country 
evidence to show that countries abundant in minerals exhibited lower growth rates. This article 
was quickly supported by Wheeler (1984) who argued that mineral exports in sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for part of the region’s poor economic position. Gelb (1988) finds that major exporters 
of oil and minerals lagged behind their counterparts in economic growth during the 1971-1983 
boom period. More recently, Satti, Loganathan and Shahbaz (2014) have shown that this 
observation holds for oil economies, whilst Butkiewizc and Yanikkaya (2010) have shown that 
mineral abundance may hamper economic growth in developing countries. The most notable 
empirical evidence for the resource curse, however, came from Sachs and Warner (1995). They 
use extensive cross-country evidence to show that an increase in the share of natural resource of 
exports leads to lower growth rates, even when controlling for a great number of potential 
cofounders, including geography, governmental efficiency, investment rates, trade policies and 
initial income.  
The causal mechanisms underlying the resource curse, however, have often been subject 
of debate. Several theories have been established empirically, but results are not always 
unambiguous as to which specific mechanism caused the curse. However, some mechanisms tend 
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to be complementary, rather than full substitutes. Which of the mechanisms is most relevant to the 
case depends on the characteristics of individual countries and regions. One important theory states 
that labor and capital are diverted away from productive sectors (mostly through rent-seeking by 
the elite), creating job losses and income stagnation (Wick and Bulte, 2006; Torvik, 2002). This, 
in turn, leads to slowed economic growth and decreased welfare (Torvik, 2002). Secondly, 
windfall resource revenues have been shown to lead to more corruption and political patronage, 
leading to lower growth (Brollo et al, 2013; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). Williams (2011) 
has shown that this process may be exacerbated by decreased governmental transparency and 
accountability caused by resource abundance. Thirdly, resource abundance has been shown to 
increase the likelihood of violent conflict and civil war, with obvious impact on economic growth 
(not to mention human welfare), especially where point-source resources are concerned (Elbadawi 
and Soto, 2015). These three mechanisms, however, are limited to developing countries, and 
cannot explain the observations of the resource curse in the industrialized world (Bunte, 2017). 
One theory that focuses on industrialized countries is the Dutch disease theory, which was used to 
‘diagnose’ the apparent industrial decline within the Dutch economy following the discovery of 
its gas fields in 1958. This theory remains the most important explanation for the resource curse 
in developed countries (Bunte, 2017).  
2.2 The Dutch disease model 
The Dutch disease phenomenon was first described in an Economist article in 1977, which 
argued that the nation’s oil exports had resulted in an increase in the value of the national currency, 
thus rendering its industry less competitive (as cited in Economist, 2010). However, several 
economists soon found that this internationally oriented view of the problem was rooted in a 
misidentification and oversimplification of the true causal mechanisms. Not much later, Corden 
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and Neary (1982) published one of the first academic models regarding the phenomenon, a model 
that retains most of its credibility to this day. They found that natural resource booms result in 
structural changes within the domestic economy. More specifically, the model finds that windfall 
revenues from resource booms decrease the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry, much 
like what happened in the Netherlands through a process that I describe later. This industrial 
decline is a major problem in Dutch disease-stricken economies, because the manufacturing sector 
is the ‘engine’ of long-term economic growth (Krugman, 1987). Several authors have argued that 
without a strong manufacturing sector, productivity growth is inhibited because the division of 
labor is constrained, leading to limited economic success (Hirschman, 1958; Seers, 1964; Sachs 
and Warner, 1995). Others have highlighted the importance of learning-by-doing within the 
manufacturing sector, which produces both significant productivity growth and spillovers into 
other areas of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1984; Matsuyama, 1992; Oomes and Kalcheva, 
2007). These structural adjustments, therefore, may lead to long-term impediments to economic 
growth, especially because a loss of manufacturing is often difficult to reverse (Krugman, 1987). 
Moreover, Cherif (2013) has recently argued that Dutch disease effects are stronger in less 
technologically advanced countries, which may lead to a self-reinforcing cycle as the Dutch 
disease worsens.  As a result, a decrease in manufacturing sector output presents a real danger to 
long-term economic growth, and constitutes an important symptom of the Dutch disease.  
Corden and Neary’s (1982) model attempts to identify the causal links between resource 
abundance and this manufacturing decline. They present the effects of windfall resource revenue 
on the labor market of a small open economy with three main sectors, two of which produce 
tradables (the resource sector and the manufacturing sector), whilst one produces non-tradables 
(services). Increased exploitation or discoveries of natural resources lead to a boom in the resource 
14 
 
sector. This serves as a prelude to two distinct processes – the resource movement effect and the 
spending effect – that both lead to a decrease in manufacturing output. The resource movement 
effect is shown in Figure 1. The y-axis shows wage levels in the respective sectors, whilst the x-
axis shows employment. Service sector employment (Ls) increases away from the left origin, 
whilst employment in the two tradable sectors (LT) increases away from the right origin. LM 
specifically shows the employment in the manufacturing sector resource sector and also increases 
away from the right origin. When a boom occurs, it raises productivity in the resource sector, 
leading to increased labor demand (indicated by arrow 1) and wage increases within this sector 
(arrow 2). If labor mobility is high and unemployment is low, wage moderation throughout the 
country increases wages in the manufacturing and services sector, too (arrow 3). Simultaneously, 
labor shifts away from these sectors towards the booming sector (arrows 2 and 4). This shift, 
combined with a loss in competitiveness due to wage increases leads to ‘direct de-industrialization’ 
and a decrease in manufacturing output ensues (Corden and Neary, 1982).  
The intuition behind the spending effect, then, is quite straightforward. Increased windfall 
revenue from resources into the economy increases aggregate domestic demand. In a sheltered 
economy, this would lead to price increases for both goods and services. In open economies, 
however, non-tradable (service) prices are expected to increase because they are produced and 
consumed domestically. However, the prices for tradables are set in the world market, making 
countries price takers. This causes a disproportionate price increase in service prices within the 
economy. Figure 2 schematically displays the spending effect on the labor market.  
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Figure 1: The resource movement effect. 
  
This figure was taken from Corden and Neary (1982) and adapted by the author.  
As prices in the service sector increase, so does its productivity and labor demand (arrow 1), and 
sectoral wages follow suit (arrow 2). Again, this leads to wage increases in the other sectors (arrow 
3), and manufacturing employment falls (arrow 4). As wages increase in the manufacturing sector, 
it becomes less competitive and contracts; this is referred to as ‘indirect de-industrialization’ 
(Corden and Neary, 1982). In essence, the spending effect is captured by an appreciation in the 
real exchange rate (RER) as described by Corden and Neary (1982) as: 
𝑅𝐸𝑅 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
Indeed, as the prices of (domestic) non-tradables increase relative to the prices of (international) 
goods, this renders a country’s manufacturing sector less competitive. This mechanism of indirect 
de- industrialization is complementary to the direct de-industrialization effect.  
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Figure 2: The spending effect. 
 
This figure was taken from Corden and Neary (1982) and adapted by the author. 
That is, with regards to the manufacturing sector, the resource movement effect and the spending 
effect work in parallel. The combined effect of both mechanisms is shown in Figure 3, where 
wages increase significantly (arrow 1), whilst manufacturing sector employment falls heavily 
(arrow 2). Thus, the Dutch disease leaves the manufacturing sector impaired.  
In practice, the theory is regularly confirmed: a large number of resource-rich countries 
have experienced this manufacturing decline. Indeed, empirical evidence of the appearance of 
Dutch disease finds that Dutch disease is commonplace and evident in many resource-rich 
countries across the globe.1 
                                                          
1 It must be noted here that, although Dutch disease is the only way the resource curse manifests itself in rich 
countries, it is by no means contained to developed countries.  
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Figure 3: The resource movement effect and spending effect combined. 
 
This figure was taken from Corden and Neary (1982) and adapted by the author. 
Several authors find evidence for Dutch disease in developing countries in Africa (see for example 
Olusi and Olagunju, 2005 for Nigeria and Otchia, 2015 for the DRC). In the Americas, Puyana 
(2000) finds evidence for Dutch disease in Colombia, as do Usui (1997) for Mexico and a 
multitude of authors for Canada (Beine, Bos and Coulombe, 2012; Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014; 
Shakeri, Gray and Leonard, 2012). Evidence is also found in post-communist countries: Hasanov 
(2013) finds evidence in Azerbaijan, whilst Mironov and Petronevich (2015) diagnose Russia. 
Laos and Kuwait are examples of afflicted countries on the Asian continent (Insisienmay, Nolintha 
and Park, 2015; Al-Sabah, 1988). Moreover, Dutch disease seems to affect countries all over the 
affluence spectrum: Fardmanesh (1991) diagnoses a host of developing countries with Dutch 
disease, whilst Hart (2010) and Koitsiwe and Adachi (2015) diagnose Australia. Finally, the 
disease may arise from a range of resource booms. Evidence has been proposed even for non-
resource sector booms, most prominently development aid transfers, remittances, and tourism, 
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although the severity of the disease seems to be relatively limited in these countries (see for 
example Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo; 2004 for remittances, Adenauer and Vagassky; 1998 for aid 
and Inchausti-Sintes, 2015 for tourism). However, as the presence of Dutch disease has been noted 
by many authors, so has the absence of an expected disease in a range of highly resource-abundant 
countries. Egert and Leonard (2008) for example, find that there is no disease in Kazakhstan. 
Likewise, Nchor et al. (2015) find no evidence of Dutch disease in Ghana, nor does Cerezo Aguirre 
(2014) in Bolivia. Most prominently, Norway is generally accepted to have avoided the disease, 
and has become one of the richest countries in the world (Larsen, 2006). This begs the question of 
how these countries have managed to avoid the Dutch disease.  
2.3 Extensions to the model 
Indeed, several authors have expressed discontent with the relative simplicity of the Dutch 
disease model of Corden and Neary (1982), and argued that it cannot explain this divergence in 
outcomes amongst resource-rich countries. More specifically, they have argued that the causal 
mechanisms with Dutch disease are affected by variables left undescribed. That is, the severity of 
the resource movement effect and the spending effect may be dependent on three factors. Firstly, 
one prominent area of research concerns the effects of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). These 
funds have traditionally been used by countries with large oil revenues, such Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait, to shelter the domestic economy from price shocks (stabilization funds). 
Alternatively, some funds have been employed by countries to ensure the longevity of their oil 
revenues, and to make sure future generations may still benefit from today’s windfall revenues 
(savings funds). An important example of this is the archetypical Norwegian Oil fund, which was 
set up to allow “both current and future generations from the petroleum revenues” (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, 2017) through saving and investing money for future generations. Several, 
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non-oil resource abundant countries have set up SWFs too (for example Botswana and Chile in 
the 1980s), although funds remain more prevalent in oil-producing nations. Some of the nations 
that employed an SWF have been very successful at keeping the resource curse at bay and even 
turn it into a blessing: Botswana and Norway both consistently outperform similar countries (with 
or without) resources in terms of GDP growth and standards of living. The success of these funds 
has prompted many (developing) nations to set up SWFs of their own; more than 30 resource-
funded SWFs have been set up since the turn of the century. Much academic research, too, has 
focused on the apparent effect of SWFs on the resource curse, not in the least the work by Van der 
Ploeg (see for example Van der Ploeg, 2011; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011; Van den Bremer 
and van der Ploeg, 2013). Apart from the stabilizing and countercyclical impact resulting from 
stabilization funds, SWFs are thought to affect the extent of Dutch disease. More specifically, by 
(temporarily) storing away resource rents from the economy, these funds may reduce the extent of 
the spending effect through decreasing aggregate domestic demand (van der Ploeg and Venables, 
2011; van der Ploeg, 2011). Some resource rents may still enter the economy through increases in 
wages in the resources sector, but these effects are expected to be relatively minor (Corden, 1984). 
As a result, SWFs are thought to constitute an important conditioning factor to the extent of Dutch 
disease.  
Secondly, several authors have argued that the extent of Dutch disease (and the resource 
curse in general) hinges on the abundance of human capital and the state of technology within the 
country. Cherif (2013) finds that countries with a technological disadvantage at the time of 
discovery are hit disproportionally hard by Dutch disease, as the spending effect is relatively large 
in these countries (because wages are usually low in these countries, resource rents have a 
relatively large effect on disposable income). This causes the productivity gap between resource-
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rich countries to grow, and hence creates a diverging pattern amongst resource-rich countries. 
Similar evidence is found by Kurtz and Brooks (2011) who find that the resource curse is less 
severe where human capital is high. Gylfason (2001) adds that a larger share of natural resources 
in a country’s economy can lead to reductions in human capital and education investment. The 
resulting process of divergence is fueled by global economic integration, which favors countries 
with high human capital, and leaves those afflicted by the resource curse behind (Kurtz and 
Brooks, 2011). More academic research into this area is therefore warranted. However, Kurtz and 
Brooks remain hopeful; human capital and education investment can be achieved through thorough 
governmental policy. Cherif (2013) agrees; stimulating the tradables sector could help remedy 
Dutch disease, as productivity growth within the economy is maintained, an important result. 
Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) point out, however, that productivity growth is a result of the strong 
competition within the manufacturing sector, so governments must take care that their stimulating 
efforts do not compromise competition faced by the companies in this sector.  
Finally, institutions matter. Since the turn of the century, many authors have pointed to the 
effects of political and economic institutions on the economic performance of countries. Most 
prominently, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) showed that institutions heavily affect 
economic growth rates in post-colonial countries. Assane and Grammy (2003) find similar 
evidence for a broadened operationalization of ‘good’ institutions for a sample of 110 countries. 
As political and economic institutions have gained theoretical traction as key determinants of 
economic development, so too are they now thought to affect the extent of Dutch disease and the 
resource curse in general. Most prominently, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) find that where 
institutions are of a high quality, natural resource abundance may raise national income levels. 
However, where institutions are worse (and more grabber friendly), resource abundance may result 
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in the curse (Mehlum et al., 2006). Arezki and van der Ploeg (2010) find similar evidence; they 
conclude that the resource curse is less severe in countries with good institutions. Robinson, Torvik 
and Verdier (2006) find that nations with institutions that promote government accountability and 
state competence are better able to deal with resource booms. Price (1998), in an early paper, found 
that Indonesia outperformed several oil exporters in combatting Dutch disease because its political 
institutions allowed for more decisive action regarding resource-based spending. With regards to 
Dutch disease specifically, van der Ploeg (2011), finds that bad institutions increase the severity 
of Dutch disease, especially when the resources concerned are point-source resources. Other 
authors, however, have argued that the effect of ‘good’ institutions on the resource curse is rather 
limited. Yang (2008) argues that specific government policies, rather than institutions counteract 
negative growth effects, whilst Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012) argue that a strong 
government can reduce the need for strong institutions in counteracting the resource curse.  
2.4 The mystery of developed countries 
These three variables, however, cannot credibly account for the differences in resource 
curse effects amongst developed countries. Although attributing some of this divergence to 
Sovereign Wealth Funds has its merits, this effect is difficult to establish empirically because of 
the rarity of such funds amongst developed countries. Moreover, some countries have escaped the 
resource curse without the use of such a fund (Bunte, 2017). Secondly, most developed countries 
are abundant in human capital and have not significantly decreased their investment in education. 
Finally, most OECD countries have ‘good’ institutions, so little divergence in resource-based 
growth outcomes would be expected to arise from general institutional quality. How can it be then, 
that Norway escaped the resource, whilst Australia and Canada did not? Several authors have 
looked for further ways to explain the divergence amongst resource abundant developed countries. 
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One promising area of research focuses on unbundling ‘good’ institutions to locate the true causal 
mechanisms. Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2013) conclude that different proxies for institutions 
“capture different aspects of the “rules of the game”” (p. 31). They find that property rights 
institutions, for example, are more effective at combatting Dutch disease than institutions that 
regulate contracts between citizens. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) find that parliamentary 
democracies are better equipped to deal with the resources curse than presidential systems, leading 
to higher growth rates. In an interesting paper investigating Norway’s success, Larsen (2006), finds 
that income coordination may “prevent the erosion of […] manufacturing” (p. 636). Similarly, 
Bunte (2017) has recently made a promising contribution to the debate. By using insights from the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature (mainly Hall and Soskice [2001]), he finds that wage bargaining 
centralization and income equality have far-reaching effects on the extent of Dutch disease in 
developed countries, and may explain some of the divergence amongst resource-rich OECD 
countries.  
2.4.1 Wage bargaining centralization 
Coordinated wage bargaining leads to wage moderation. That is, where wage bargaining is 
centralized, wages are compressed. This has been shown to hold empirically (Baccaro and Simoni, 
2010), as well as theoretically (Löfgren, 1993; Wallerstein, 1990). Wallerstein (1990) and Bunte 
(2017) find that centralized unions limit wage demands because they internalize the negative 
inflationary effects of wage increases in previously separated labor segments. That is, if a segment 
of workers gets wage increases, this causes inflation as aggregate consumption rises. Workers that 
do not get a raise, then, are worse-off than in the original situation as their purchasing power 
decreases. Decentralized unions do no internalize these effects, and hence demand large wage 
hikes. Centralized bargaining associations, on the other hand, limit the externalities, leading to 
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wage moderation. Centralized bargaining also leads to relatively small wage differentials between 
sectors, as centralized union specifically try to avoid large pay gaps between members of different 
sectors (Wallerstein, 1990; Bunte, 2017). Hence, the degree of wage bargaining centralization is 
expected to affect both the spending effect and the resource movement effect (though mainly the 
latter). That is, wage moderation between sectors should decrease the resource movement effect 
as labor is no longer pulled away from the manufacturing sector. Moreover, it will suppress wage 
hikes in the services sector caused by the spending effect. A limited increase in overall wage levels, 
then, should limit the spending effect as aggregate consumption rises relatively little, avoiding the 
adverse effects of real exchange rate appreciation. All in all, centralized wage bargaining is 
expected to reduce the extent of Dutch disease. 
2.4.2 Inequality 
Whereas increased windfall revenues are usually assumed to have a similar effect across 
countries, Bunte (2017) argues that this is not the case. Rather, it matters into which hands they 
fall. Indeed, Behzadan et al. (2017) argue that inequality in resource rent distribution exacerbates 
Dutch disease. However, even if windfall revenues are equally spread across the population, 
previously existing income and wealth differences may shape the outcome of Dutch disease. 
Income inequality is expected to have a stimulating effect on Dutch disease (or conversely, 
equality may limit Dutch disease) because fundamental differences in spending behavior exist 
among consumers. Wealthier people tend to spend more money on services, whereas less affluent 
people spend disproportionally on tradables (Bohman and Nilsson, 2007). Indeed, affluent 
consumers “exhibit a high [income] elasticity of demand for services, while low-income earners 
show a low [income] elasticity of demand for services” (Bunte, 2017, p. 682). If the demand for 
services is indeed convex for increases in income, higher inequality will result in higher demand 
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for services (see Bunte [2017] for a thorough explanation of this mechanism). As a result, countries 
with higher inequality experience a larger increase in aggregate service demand than do more equal 
countries, and their affliction with the spending effect is worse. This means that all arrows depicted 
in Figure 2 are shorter in countries with more equality; limited service demand expansion ensues, 
lowering overall wage increases and lowering labor movement away from the manufacturing 
sector. In addition, real exchange rate appreciation is limited, keeping the manufacturing sector 
more competitive in the world market. Thus, income equality on a national level is expected to 
condition the severity of Dutch disease phenomena mainly through limiting the spending effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
3. Empirical Implications and Hypotheses 
 
As pointed out before, the main aim of this thesis is to extend on the contributions made 
by Bunte (2017), and to establish whether his results are generalizable to a larger sample of 
developed countries. In other words: I attempt to establish whether inequality and centralized wage 
bargaining really affect Dutch disease in developed countries. I use Bunte’s (2017) work as a 
theoretical basis, but employ a more thorough empirical analysis. The merit of this thesis is thus 
two-fold. Firstly, I look at different periods of time. Bunte (2017) used a sample of 19 OECD 
countries for the period 1970-2000, whereas I employ data for the years 1995-2014. Utilizing these 
years allows for inclusion of the years of global financial crisis starting in 2007. This may affect 
the estimation results as crises are known to have strong effects on the economy, increase 
divergence, and affect inequality. More generally, this period allows me to test whether the results 
found by Bunte (2017) are still relevant to more recent time frames. Secondly, utilizing this time 
period increases my sample to 31 countries (mostly because of the availability of post-communist 
country data), which enhances the generalizability of the results.  
The theory of Dutch disease stipulates that the disease (and in extension, decentralized 
wage bargaining and inequality) results in lower economic growth rates. Theoretically, therefore, 
one would like to measure the direct effect of these variables on economic growth. However, there 
are several reasons why using growth rates as a dependent variable for the analysis of this thesis 
is not practical, or even desirable. Firstly, Dutch disease is expected to decrease the long-term 
economic performance of countries, but the short-run economic effects of resource rents probably 
do not exhibit a similar correlation. In fact, it is very likely that an increase in resource rents has a 
26 
 
positive impact on short-run growth (as it drives up GDP levels). Hence, such an analysis would 
disregard negative Dutch disease effects. This problem becomes more concrete due to the 
relatively short time span of the analysis in this paper (15 years). Secondly, national GDP levels 
are affected by a great number of factors, which makes it difficult to precisely estimate the effect 
of inequality and wage bargaining (there will be a lot of statistical ‘noise’). Thirdly, it is not 
unlikely that GDP growth affects the variables of interest. That is, GDP growth may be expected 
to fuel (or dampen) inequality and shape wage bargaining decisions, leading to an endogeneity 
problem. Finally, the aim of this paper is to specifically measure the effect of inequality and 
centralized wage bargaining on Dutch disease mechanisms, not on overall economic performance. 
That is, the variables may affect economic performance through channels other than Dutch disease, 
but these mechanisms lie outside the scope of this paper. For these reasons, I have to employ a 
different variable, one unlikely to result in an endogeneity bias, is a good parameter of Dutch 
disease, and readily available for OECD countries.  
One of the most important symptoms of the disease is a decrease in non-resource exports 
caused by the spending effect and the resource movement effect. As such, the share of non-
resource exports constitutes a good parameter of Dutch disease. Furthermore, these figures are 
available for most countries, and it seems unlikely to be an important predictor of inequality and 
wage bargaining centralization. Indeed, several other authors studying Dutch disease have used 
non-resource exports as a parameter of Dutch disease. The figure is also used by Bunte (2017), but 
I take a more precise measure. However (as Bunte [2017]) recognizes, the manufacturing sector 
remains the most important sector in the Dutch disease model, as it the engine of innovation 
(Corden and Neary, 1982; Krugman, 1987). Hence, I employ the manufacturing share of exports 
in parallel with non-resource exports as a second parameter of Dutch disease. Finally, I use the 
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manufacturing sector output as a part of GDP, as is common in the literature, as a third 
operationalization of the Dutch disease symptoms. As income equality and wage bargaining 
centralization are expected to counter the spending effect and the resource movement effect, this 
implies two hypotheses: 
1. Countries with more centralized wage bargaining experience a smaller drop in non-
resource exports or manufacturing performance when resource rents increase than do 
countries with less centralized wage bargaining. 
2. Countries with more income equality experience a smaller drop in non-resource exports or 
manufacturing performance when resource rents increase than do countries with more 
unequal income distributions.  
These hypotheses answer the main research questions of this paper. However, for further 
consolidation of the effects of wage bargaining centralization and inequality, I also test for their 
specific effects on main variables within the Dutch disease, akin to Bunte (2017). I do this for two 
main reasons. Firstly, doing this allows me to test specifically whether they affect manufacturing 
and non-resource export numbers through conditioning Dutch disease effects, rather than through 
unspecified channels. That is, if centralized wage bargaining and equality are found to affect 
individual Dutch disease parameters, this would add empirical strength to the theory. And 
secondly, this allows me to approximate their respective effects on the spending effect and the 
resource movement effect individually. It follows from the theory that wage bargaining 
centralization mainly affects the resource movement effects, whilst inequality is mainly expected 
to condition the spending effect. Testing for these effects could consolidate or weaken these 
theories. First, I test for the effect of centralized wage bargaining and inequality on the spending 
effect. This endeavor is relatively straightforward; real exchange rates are available for most 
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countries. As this variable constitutes a relatively good measure of the spending effects, two further 
hypotheses are implied. If inequality and wage bargaining centralization condition the spending 
effect, then:  
3. Countries with more centralized wage bargaining experience a smaller increase in the real 
exchange rate when resource rents increase than do countries with less centralized wage 
bargaining. 
4. Countries with more income equality experience a smaller increase in the real exchange 
rate when resource rents increase than do countries with more unequal income 
distributions. 
With regards to the resource movement effect, Bunte (2017) finds that the effects of wage 
bargaining centralization and inequality on this mechanism are significant, because they suppress 
manufacturing wage rates. Contrary to this, I argue that both the resource movement effect and the 
spending effect increase wage rates in the manufacturing sector (akin to the Corden and Neary 
[1982] model). Indeed, it is likely that wage hike limitation in the manufacturing sector is a result 
of conditioning on both the resource movement effect and the spending effect, because both 
resource sector and services sector wage hikes drive up manufacturing wages. As such, a decreased 
manufacturing wage rate does not constitute definitive evidence that centralized wage bargaining 
and inequality affect the resource movement effect. This observation complicates the analysis 
somewhat, because it becomes very difficult to disentangle the effects of the variables on the 
resource movement effect from their effects on the spending effect, as they have the same end-
result. However, studying the effects of wage bargaining centralization and inequality on wage 
rates is not without merit; they remain important parameters of manufacturing competitiveness, 
even if they are not specifically parameters of the resource movement effect. Hence, if Bunte’s 
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(2017) findings are confirmed, this analysis would still provide evidence for a conditioning effect 
of the variables on Dutch disease. Hence, I apply two further hypotheses: 
5. Countries with more centralized wage bargaining experience a smaller increase in wage 
rates when resource rents increase than do countries with less centralized wage bargaining. 
6. Countries with more income equality experience a smaller increase in wage rates when 
resource rents increase than do countries with more unequal income distributions.  
Finally, Corden and Neary (1982) stress the effects of Dutch disease on the labor market; 
most of the contraction of the manufacturing sector, they argue, is due to a decrease in (relative) 
manufacturing employment. Indeed, the model finds that one of the most important effects of 
Dutch disease is the shift of labor away from the manufacturing sector due to direct and indirect 
de-industrialization. Hence, the share of manufacturing employments may be used to measure the 
extent of Dutch disease, a figure Bunte (2017) fails to consider. As centralized wage bargaining is 
expected to suppress sectoral wage differences, the movement of labor away from the 
manufacturing sector is expected to be lower where bargaining centralization is high. Likewise, a 
decrease in the spending effect due to income equality is expected to soften wage increases in the 
services sector, thus limiting incentives for labor to move towards that sector. This implies two 
final hypotheses: 
7. Countries with more centralized wage bargaining experience a smaller decrease in 
manufacturing employment when resource rents increase than do countries with less 
centralized wage bargaining.  
8. Countries with more income equality experience a smaller decrease in manufacturing 
employment when resource rents increase than do countries with more unequal income 
distribution. 
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4. Methodology 
 
I employ panel data analysis to test for the effects of wage bargaining centralization, 
income equality and resource abundance. The multitude of hypotheses, of course, implies that 
several regression equations are estimated. Although the dependent variable differs per model, that 
main independent variables of interest remain the same: centralized wage bargaining, inequality, 
and resource rents. Hence, these variables are represented in all regressions presented. Because 
inequality and centralized wage bargaining are somewhat correlated, and expected to counter each 
other’s effects, I estimate their effects independently. The control variables, however, change per 
dependent variable, because not all control variables are expected to affect all individual dependent 
variables. Finally, because the variables of interest are expected to condition the effect of resource 
rents on the dependent variables, it is paramount to add an interaction variable to every regression.  
Hence, all regression equations presented in this paper take the following form:  
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 
𝛽3(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀            
Or in short: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀    (1) 
Where the dependent variable (Y) differs by hypothesis, and the controls differ by dependent 
variable. Moreover, the independent variable differs per model; IV denotes either wage bargaining 
centralization or inequality. i denotes country, whilst t denotes the time variable (year) and ε 
denotes the error term.  
31 
 
4.1 Sample 
The aim of this paper is to study Dutch disease effects in developed countries. Hence, the 
analysis presented in this thesis is restricted to 31 OECD countries (an increase of 13 countries 
compared to Bunte [2017]).2 3 1995 was the chosen starting year, as this greatly increased the 
number of countries available, mainly because data for the post-communist countries are available 
from that year onwards. Reliable and precise data for most of the variables of interest (as well as 
the control variables) are available until 2014 for most countries. As such, the time span of the 
analysis is 1995-2014, exactly 20 years. All data used are national statistics, and most of the data 
are readily available and taken from online databases from the IMF, OECD and the World Bank. 
For all estimates, I use fixed effect models because it seems reasonable that there are time-invariant 
variables that affect the dependent variables, as well as condition the effect that the independent 
variables have on them. Moreover, because I use a limited sample of OECD countries, random 
variance cannot be assumed. Finally, I correct for related standard errors and auto-correlation.  
4.3 Dependent variables: Performance, Wages, Exchange Rates, and Labor 
As noted before, I apply 3 main parameters to diagnose the overall severity of Dutch 
disease within countries. Firstly, I use the share of non-resource exports, the data for which are not 
readily available online. Bunte (2017) tries to approximate this by subtracting the share of either 
oil or the share of total resource rents of GDP from the total exports as a share of GDP. Contrarily, 
                                                          
2 Of course, there are developed countries outside the OECD, such as Singapore and Lithuania. However, data for 
these countries is more limited for the operationalizations of the variables used in this analysis. Further research 
could therefore focus on trying to further extend the country panel to include countries outside the OECD.  
3 The countries used for the analysis in this paper were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the UK, and the United States.  
Bunte (2017) used Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.  
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I use the World Trade Organization database to calculate the value of fuel and mining products as 
a share of merchandise exports (2017). These products encompass oil, coal, and gas, as well as 
valuable minerals: the most important causes of Dutch disease. These figures are then subtracted 
from 100 to find the non-resource share of merchandise exports. The data for the second 
(manufacturing share of exports) and third (manufacturing share of GDP) parameter were taken 
from the World Bank (2017a; 2017b), and are readily available from the database on the website. 
Similarly, I use two measures of the real exchange rate to approximate the spending effect. To 
capture effects for producers, I employ the unit labor cost calculated real exchange rate, which 
compares labor prices per output amongst countries. To capture the effects for consumers, the 
second measure is the real exchange rate based on the consumer price index, which measures 
product price differences amongst nations. Both figures were taken from the IMF databases 
(2017a; 2017b), and, akin to Bunte (2017) normalized (where 2010=100).   
To test hypotheses 5 and 6, I employ three more variables to represent national wage hikes. 
As noted before, both income equality and centralized wage bargaining are expected to suppress 
overall nation-wide wage levels. Firstly, I use economy-wide hourly labor compensation to 
approximate general wage levels. Secondly, I use economy-wide unit labor cost data to 
approximate the real costs faced by employers per output produced, an important measure of 
international competitiveness. Finally, to estimate the effect of wage bargaining centralization and 
inequality on the manufacturing sector specifically, I use the hourly earnings in the manufacturing 
sector. The data for all three of these measures were retrieved from the OECD, and, again, 
normalized (2010=100) (OECD, 2017a; OECD, 2017b; OECD, 2017c). Finally, the 
manufacturing share of employment data used for hypotheses 7 and 8 were taken from the 
International Labor Organization (2017).  
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4.4 Key independent variables: Resource rents, Inequality, and Wage Bargaining 
Centralization 
As noted before, there are three main independent variables for the analysis in this thesis. 
Firstly, to assess resource abundance, I include a variable for resource rents. Many scholars have 
approximated the importance of resource rents to the economy by using resource rents as a share 
of GDP. An important advantage of this variable is that it is readily available for many countries, 
resulting in wide analytical coverage. As such, I retrieved this variable from the World Bank 
(2017c). To approximate wage bargaining coordination, I use the Centralized Wage Bargaining 
variable from the ICTWSS database, developed by Visser (2016). Finally, to measure inequality, 
I use the Gini-coefficient developed by the OECD (2017d). Because the spending effect is affected 
by the spending of citizens, I use the Gini-coefficient post-taxes and transfers to account for the 
true effect of disposable income inequality. Moreover, because Gini-coefficients are not estimated 
yearly, I interpolate the measurements to increase the sample size.4 Theoretically this is justified 
because inequality is not expected to change quickly, and hence the interpolated figures are 
expected to closely represent true inequality.  
4.5 Control variables and equations 
Overall, I apply 10 control variables, which vary by hypothesis and in extension per 
dependent variable. Several of the control variables for hypotheses 1-6 were conceptually taken 
from the ground-laying work by Bunte (2017). When regressing for non-resource exports and 
manufacturing exports (hypothesis 1 and 2), I control for several variables that may affect exports. 
Firstly, I use unemployment levels and yearly GDP per capita growth to account for the state of 
                                                          
4 I do not extrapolate the data, which leads the inequality models to be calculated over a different sample than the 
wage bargaining models.   
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the economy, both taken from the OECD (2017e; 2017f). To account for the effect of the labor 
market on exports, I control for labor productivity (GDP per hour worked) and mean income of 
employees (average yearly wage), akin to Bunte (2017) (OECD, 2017g; OECD 2017h). Moreover, 
I include domestic nominal effective exchange rates to account for currency effects, taken from 
the IMF (2017c). Finally, I include a simple dummy variable for the global crisis, which occurred 
between 2007 and 2009, to account for the effects the global crisis may have had on the parameters.  
As such, the regression equation becomes: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡   
+𝛽7𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀          (2)  
Where U denotes unemployment, GDP denotes GDP per capita, LP denotes labor productivity, W 
denotes mean wage income and NEER denotes nominal effective exchange rate. As noted in the 
above paragraph, RR denotes either resource dependence or resource abundance.  
Hypothesis 3 and 4 reflect the effect of wage bargaining centralization and inequality on 
the real exchange rate. Naturally, therefore, I control for the nominal exchange rate, as it heavily 
affects the RER. Furthermore, since the RER essentially captures price differences between 
countries, I include domestic inflation levels (measured in the change in consumer price index) 
from the OECD (2017i). In extension, I account for central bank independence, taken from Garriga 
(2016), because their behavior is likely to affect both price levels and exchange rates. Finally, I 
control for the state of the economy by including unemployment, GDP per capita growth and the 
crisis dummy. This results in the following regression equation: 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡    
+𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝜀      (3) 
Where CPI denotes inflation and CBI denotes central bank independence.  
As for hypothesis 5 and 6 (the effects on wage rates), I use five control variables. 
Unemployment affects worker’s bargaining positions, and is naturally added to the equation. The 
same holds by unionization of workers, which I capture by the union density: the share of 
employed workers that are part of a trade union, akin to Bunte (2017) (taken from OECD, 2017j). 
Of course, labor productivity affects wages, as does inflation, and these variables are included. 
Finally, I control for the state of the economy by including GDP per capita growth and the crisis 
variable. As such, this is the equation that follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡   
+𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀       (4) 
Where UD denotes union density.  
Finally, hypothesis 7 and 8 capture the effect on the manufacturing employment. As the 
share of employment is used, I control for the unemployment rate, since it affects total employment 
and bargaining positions. Secondly, to account for the state of the economy and increasing 
domestic demand I control for domestic GDP per capita growth and the crisis dummy. Finally, I 
control for worldwide GDP growth (taken from the World Bank, 2017d) and nominal exchange 
rate to account for foreign demand, which is expected to affect the demand for manufactured 
goods. I explicitly control for the effects of labor productivity changes, because these are the 
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specific variables Dutch disease is expected to affect, which may result in (partially) filtering out 
the sought-after effect. Hence, the final equation becomes: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐺𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  
+𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀       (5)  
Where GlGDP denotes global GDP.  
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5. Results 
 
 
5.1 Simple models 
 
The simplest models (regressing each dependent variable against resource rents as a share 
of GDP only) all show the expected regression trends. That is, resource dependence negatively 
affects manufacturing performance and manufacturing employment, whilst it appreciates real 
exchange rates and drives up wages. Figure 4, for example, shows the relation between resource 
rents as a share of GDP and the manufacturing share of employment, which shows a clear negative 
trend. These observations are maintained when Norway is excluded as an outlier (it has a large 
abundance of resources as well as high equality and strongly coordinated wage bargaining). 
Therefore, these simple models seem to constitute evidence for Dutch disease for the sample, 
which increases the confidence in the applicability of this sample to Dutch disease analysis. 
Figure 5, then, shows some tentative evidence of the conditioning effect of wage bargaining 
centralization. It shows the same data as Figure 4, but splits countries into two groups: one contains 
countries with an above-average CWB score (the right panel), whilst those with a below-average 
score are in the other group (the left panel). The slope in the right panel is less steep, meaning that 
the negative effect of resource rents on the manufacturing share of GDP is smaller for this group 
(this observation is significant at α=0.05). This suggests that wage coordination indeed conditions 
negative Dutch disease effects. The same is done in Figure 6 for inequality, where the right panel 
shows countries with above-average inequality, and the left panel shows those with below-average  
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Figure 4: The manufacturing share of employment and resource abundance. 
 
 
inequality. This figure shows the opposite of what may be expected: rather than showing a larger 
effect, the left panel (containing countries with more inequality) shows a smaller negative effect 
of resources on the manufacturing share of GDP. The difference between the slope of these is 
significant at the 5% cut-off level.5 
5.2 The adjusted models 
However, the results of these simple models change markedly when constructing a more 
rigorous analysis. As described above, I apply 9 dependent variables to estimate the effects of 
wage bargaining, inequality and resource rents on the Dutch disease (3 for overall effects, 2 for 
effects on real exchange rates, 3 for wage rates and 1 for manufacturing employment).  
                                                          
5 Although inequality pushes it in the ‘wrong’ direction, it is still worth noting that both Figure 6 and Figure 7 show 
a negative effect of resource on manufacturing share of GDP. That is, centralized wage bargaining also does not 
seem to succeed at ‘reversing’ the resource curse.  
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Figure 5: The manufacturing share of employment and resource abundance. Left: Countries with below average wage 
bargaining centralization. Right: Countries with above-average wage bargaining centralization. 
 
The nine resulting equations were estimated twice, once each for inequality and wage bargaining 
centralization. This leads to a total of 18 models, 9 for each independent variable of interest. Tables 
1-8 list the estimation results of these different models. The tables are first separated by 
independent variable: tables 1-4 list the estimates for the models using wage bargaining 
centralization (models 1.1-1.9), whilst tables 5-8 list the estimates for the models that include 
inequality (models 2.1-2.9). The tables are then separated by dependent variable. Table 1 and 5 
list the estimates for manufacturing and exports performance, whilst table 2 and 6 list those for the 
real exchange rate. Table 3 and 7, then, are for the models with wage rates as the dependent 
variable. Finally, models 4 and 8 describe the effects on the manufacturing share of employment. 
As the first three dependent variable are approximated through multiple operationalizations, tables 
1-3 and 5-7 list multiple models. The independent variables for the models within each table, 
however, stay the same.  
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Figure 6: The manufacturing share of employment and resource abundance. Left: Countries with below-average 
inequality. Right: Countries with above-average inequality.  
 
5.2.1 General observations 
Before analyzing the specific results of each model, there are some interesting observations 
that occur throughout all models. Firstly, the number of observations differ markedly by model. 
That is, the models for inequality (2.1-2.9) have consistently less observations than the models for 
centralized wage bargaining, because Gini coefficients are not estimated regularly.6 However, the 
countries remain unchanged per model (that is, model 1.1 used the same country sample as model 
2.1, etc.). As such, the sample difference between the models is minimized, although the studied 
years may differ. The R2, then, is very high for each model (ranging between 0.77 and 0.97), 
however this probably reflects the inclusion of all country dummies (used to estimate the fixed 
effects), rather than the predictive power of the independent variables. Finally, GDP per capita 
growth is significant in almost all models, and seems especially (positively) associated with 
                                                          
6 The effect of this was limited by interpolating this measure, which drastically increased the number of 
observations.  
41 
 
manufacturing measure, perhaps signaling that a strong manufacturing performance indeed leads 
to economic growth. Yet, this paper focuses on the effects of wage bargaining centralization and 
inequality on Dutch disease. Therefore, the main variables of interest are resource rents and its 
interaction variables with wage bargaining centralization and inequality7. As such, I discuss the 
estimation results of these variables in most detail, starting with the resource rents. 
5.2.2 Resource rents 
The expected direction of the effect of resource rents differs by dependent variable. That is, rents 
were expected to have negative effects on manufacturing performance and employment, and a 
positive effect on the real exchange rate and wage rates. In the models with centralized wage 
bargaining, this largely holds; 8 out of 9 models exhibit the expected significance and direction 
(rents do not influence the manufacturing share of employment). For the models that include 
inequality, however, this is quite different. In these models, only 2 out of the 9 models show a 
significant effect of windfall revenue. Indeed, resource rents do not exhibit significant effects on 
wage rates, real exchange rates or the manufacturing share of employment at all when inequality 
is included.  
5.2.3 Wage Bargaining Centralization 
The effect of wage bargaining centralization (and its interaction variable with resource 
dependence) on the dependent variables is not unambiguous. As for manufacturing performance, 
the interaction variable shows no significant effect on any of the variables, nor does the wage 
coordination variable by itself. However, the interaction variable has a significant negative effect 
on both operationalizations of the real exchange rate. Nevertheless, the wage coordination variable 
                                                          
7 That is, CWB*RR and IQ*RR. 
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(by itself) shows a positive effect on the real exchange rate measured through labor costs. Thirdly, 
centralized wage bargaining conditions the positive effects of resource rents on national wages and 
labor costs: the interaction variable is negative. Yet, this observation does not hold for 
manufacturing wages, which are left unaffected by the interaction variable, nor by the wage 
coordination variable without interaction with resource rents. Finally, although the centralized 
wage bargaining variable exhibits a positive effect on the manufacturing share of employment, the 
interaction variable is insignificant.  
5.2.4 Inequality 
The inequality-rents interaction variable, too, provides several interesting results. Like 
centralized wage bargaining, inequality does not condition the effect of resource rents on non-
resource and manufacturing exports. However, it does condition resource effects on the 
manufacturing share of GDP. That is, equality increases the manufacturing share of GDP when 
resource rents increase.8 Secondly, inequality exhibits an ambiguous effect on the spending effect: 
it shows a significant (positive) effect on the CPI exchange rate, but not on the ULC exchange rate. 
However, the inequality variable by itself is significant for both measures: more inequality means 
a lower real exchange rate. Thirdly, the interaction variable shows a significant and positive effect 
on manufacturing wages as well as national wages and labor costs. This means that, when resource 
rents increase, more equal countries will have lower wage increases. However, these countries 
tend to have higher wages in the absence of windfall resource revenues: the inequality variable 
shows a negative effect on wages. Finally, the interaction variable shows no significant effect on 
                                                          
8 The inequality variable is structured such that higher the inequality figure, the less equal a country is. Hence, the 
observations should be interpreted in the opposite manner of the CWB figures: this negative value means that 
more inequality decreases the manufacturing share of GDP.  
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manufacturing employment. Inequality by itself, however, shows a significant negative effect, 
meaning that more unequal countries tend to have a smaller manufacturing sector.   
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6. Discussion 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the conditioning effects of wage bargaining 
centralization and inequality on several variables that serve as parameters of Dutch disease. 
Naturally then, the coefficients for the interaction variables of wage coordination and inequality 
are the main estimates of interest, as well as the independent effects of the resource abundance 
variable. The main question remains: do centralized wage bargaining and inequality limit the 
extent of Dutch disease? I discuss my findings one by one, starting with wage bargaining 
centralization. 
6.1 Wage bargaining centralization 
Four hypotheses were used to ascertain the effects of wage bargaining centralization. 
Firstly, there is no evidence that wage bargaining centralization increases manufacturing or export 
performance. Contrary to expectation, it does not exhibit a significant effect when resource rents 
rise. That is, wage coordination does not condition the effects of windfall revenue increases on 
Dutch disease, contrary to what Bunte (2017) found. As such, hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed. 
Likewise, wage bargaining centralization does not condition the effects of resource rents on 
manufacturing employment. Therefore, hypothesis 7 also remains absent confirmation.9 Hence, an 
overall conditioning effect of centralized wage bargaining on the Dutch disease, as found by Bunte 
(2017), was not found in this sample. Evidence for an effect on the individual mechanisms of 
Dutch disease, however, was found, albeit partially. Hypothesis 3 stipulated that a high degree of 
                                                          
9 However, wage coordination (by itself) increases the manufacturing share of employment. All else constant, it 
may therefore be in the interest of Dutch disease afflicted countries to install wage bargaining centralization. 
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centralized wage bargaining conditions the positive effects of resource rents on the real exchange 
rate. This observation holds for both models used (model 1.4 and 1.5). As such, there is strong 
evidence that the spending effect is limited by wage bargaining centralization.10 Finally, 
hypothesis 5 may be partially confirmed. Wage bargaining centralization is indeed a conditioning 
factor for resource rents when looking at national wage rates and labor costs. However, this effect 
is not observed for the manufacturing sector; contrary to expectation, centralized wage bargaining 
does little to reduce manufacturing wage rates. These wage rates are, of course, crucial to the Dutch 
disease, as wages increases within the sector are the true adversaries of manufacturing sector 
competitiveness. As such, I conclude that, although wage coordination decreases the effect of 
resource rents on wage hikes, it does little to prevent Dutch disease. This is contrary to expectation: 
manufacturing wage moderation was thought to be the main effect of wage coordination according 
to Bunte (2017). All in all, whereas Bunte (2017) found evidence for all the hypotheses, I only 
find a significant conditioning effect of wage bargaining centralization on the spending effect. 
6.2 Inequality 
As pointed out, the results for the inequality estimates are also not unambiguous, nor do 
they always show the expected direction or significance. Again, there were 4 hypotheses to be 
tested. Firstly, whereas Bunte (2017) finds evidence for all models, the evidence in this sample for 
hypothesis 2 is mixed: in times of high resource revenue, more equality leads to a higher share of 
manufacturing in GDP, but it does not affect export performance. On the face of it, this would 
seem to reflect mixed evidence of Dutch disease conditioning. However, the Dutch disease model 
                                                          
10 However, although wage coordination reduces the exchange rate when windfall revenue rises, the CWB variable 
by itself shows a positive correlation with the unit labor cost real exchange rate, indicating that perhaps a high 
degree of centralized wage bargaining may remain harmful to economies if resource rents are relatively low. That 
is, wage coordination may decrease the extent of Dutch disease when resource rents are high, but this effect may 
be offset by the upwards effect of wage coordination on the real exchange rate. 
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specifies the importance of innovation in the manufacturing sector itself, not export performance; 
the manufacturing sector is the engine of growth, regardless of where the produced goods end up 
(Corden and Neary, 1982; Krugman, 1987).  As such, although exports are left unaffected by 
income inequality, I conclude that more equality indeed leads to a lower extent of Dutch disease. 
Hence, hypothesis 2 is confirmed. The evidence for hypothesis 4, then, reflects similar results. 
Inequality does not condition the effect of resource rents on the consumer real exchange rate (CPI). 
Yet, when resource rents rise, an increase in inequality drives up the unit labor cost calculated real 
exchange rate (or conversely, more equality leads to a lower relative labor price per unit of output). 
The latter is of more importance to the Dutch disease model; manufacturing cost hikes lead to 
deteriorating competitiveness, whilst consumer price differences do not directly affect suppliers’ 
performance on the world market. However, if equality does not counter Dutch disease-caused 
inflation, this may lead to relative wage hikes in the long run, as wages rise alongside the price 
level. As such, I conclude that hypothesis 4 may be partially confirmed. More research into the 
true effect of inequality on the real exchange rate (specifically in Dutch disease settings) could 
shed further light on this conclusion. The evidence for hypothesis 6 is more conclusive. The 
expected conditioning effect on wage rates is evident for all three models. That is, equality 
decreases manufacturing wages as well as national wage rates and labor costs when resource rents 
increase. As such, I conclude that there is strong evidence for hypothesis 6. Finally, the estimates 
show no significant conditioning effect of inequality on the manufacturing share of employment 
Therefore, hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed. 
6.3 Comparison to Bunte (2017) 
Bunte (2017) finds evidence for all of the first six hypotheses I propose. This thesis finds 
strong evidence for two of these (hypotheses 3 and 6), partial or tentative evidence for three 
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(hypothesis 2, 4 and 5), and no evidence for one (hypothesis 1). Moreover, I find no evidence that 
the employment shift away from the manufacturing due to windfall revenue, theorized to be the 
main mechanism of Dutch disease, is countered by either variable (Corden and Neary, 1982). As 
such, although I test for the same independent variables, the analysis in this paper leads to different 
results than those found by Bunte (2017). This begs the question of what may cause our analyses 
to lead to different outcomes. One explanation that comes to mind is that different 
operationalization of the variables of interest (centralized wage bargaining and inequality) may 
lead to the varying estimates. However, this cannot be the case; I use the same data from the same 
databases.11 This leaves three possible explanations. Firstly, the specification of the model may be 
different. Secondly, the theory proposed by Bunte (that wage bargaining centralization and 
inequality condition the main mechanisms of Dutch disease) may not empirically hold. That is, the 
theory may be erroneous. And finally, wage bargaining centralization and inequality only 
condition the Dutch disease under certain conditions which are present in Bunte’s (2017) sample, 
but not in the sample used for this thesis. I now discuss these three possibilities in more detail.  
6.3.1 The specification of the model 
In general, the specification of the model in this paper was consciously chosen to represent 
the model used by Bunte (2017) as closely as possible. The estimated models, by and large, include 
similar dependent variables, independent variables and control variables, and, where possible, data 
from the same databases. Moreover, as is warranted by the structure of the data, both articles apply 
panel regression analysis with fixed effects. Furthermore, as is standard practice, following Beck 
                                                          
11 That is, the post-taxes and transfer GINI coefficient from the OECD and the Centralized Wage Bargaining variable 
from the ICTWSS database.  
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and Katz (1995), both analyses were estimated with panel-corrected standard error, and controlled 
for autoregressive error structures (AR1).  
The analysis in the paper, however, consciously differed from Bunte’s (2017) in two ways. 
Firstly, I include a crisis dummy to account for its possible effects on inequality and general 
national economic structures. However, the estimates for this variable are not significant under 
any of the tested models.12 Moreover, estimating the models without including the crisis dummy 
variable does not change the significance or direction of any of the coefficients of interest. 
Secondly, the operationalization of resource abundance in this thesis differed from that used by 
Bunte (2017), who applies the resource rents per capita supplied by Dunning (2008). This variable 
represents a somewhat recent approach to measuring resource abundance, in contrast to the 
resource share of GDP used in earlier papers. Most prominently, Dunning (2008) has championed 
the use of this variable, as he finds that rather than measuring resource abundance, resource share 
of GDP measure resource dependence. This may be problematic when analyzing the resource 
curse; where dependence on resources is high, it is very likely that the manufacturing sector is 
relatively weak. As such, using the resource share of GDP may lead to an overestimation of Dutch 
disease effects (Dunning, 2008). However, I consciously decided to use the resource rents share 
of GDP for the analysis in this paper, for two main reasons. Firstly, the temporal data coverage for 
resource rents per capita is limited, which would have greatly diminished the size of the considered 
sample. Secondly, I consciously applied a different operationalization of the resource rents 
variable to test for the robustness of the results found by Bunte (2017). However, further research 
into the effects of operationalization differences is recommended. As for now, I tentatively 
                                                          
12 This, in itself, is quite peculiar. For example, one would expect crises to affect wage rates, or perhaps affect 
export performance. To my knowledge, no-one has attempted to study the effects of global crises on Dutch 
disease. Future research into these areas could further consolidate our understanding of the disease. 
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conclude that, although the differences between the estimates found in Bunte (2017) and this paper 
may be due to differences in resource abundance specification, this is unlikely, especially because 
using the resource share of GDP is expected to lead to an overestimation of Dutch disease effects 
(Dunning, 2008). 
6.3.2 Implications for the theory 
A second possibility is that the theory is wrong. That is, wage bargaining centralization 
and inequality do not affect the extent of Dutch disease, and the relation found by Bunte (2017) is 
spurious. However, there are several reasons why this is unlikely. First (and most important), 
Bunte (2017) finds evidence for a great number of models and robustness checks. Like the analysis 
in this paper, he uses several operationalizations of the dependent variables, which all lead to 
similar results. Moreover, he estimates the effects of wage coordination and inequality on the 
individual Dutch disease mechanisms (that is, on the real exchange rate and wages). The possibility 
that all these effects are spurious is highly unlikely. Moreover, the analysis in this paper is not 
entirely without confirmation of these results (again, two of the hypotheses were confirmed). 
Therefore, it is more likely that wage bargaining centralization and inequality do indeed condition 
Dutch disease, but that this effect occurs only (or more prominently) under certain conditions 
Indeed, the economic and political circumstances differed considerably for both samples. 
That is, the countries in this thesis’ sample were markedly different from those used by Bunte 
(2017). As noted before, the analysis in Bunte (2017) was restricted to most of the traditional 
welfare states, like Germany, Sweden, and the United States. These countries were represented in 
this thesis, too, but with the addition of a large number of countries with vastly different political 
systems and standards of living, most of them post-communist. As a result, the conditioning effect 
of inequality and wage bargaining centralization could be expected to differ for these countries, 
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especially because their industries were still affected by their history of communism, especially in 
the earlier years of analysis (Culpan and Kumar, 1995). That is, the conditioning effect of wage 
coordination and inequality on Dutch disease may be restricted to mature welfare states. To check 
for this possibility, I run the analysis again, but include only the traditional welfare states used by 
Bunte (2017).13 With respect to the centralized wage bargaining models, this changes little: most 
estimates are left unaffected, whilst some become insignificant. However, with respect to the 
inequality models, altering the country sample considerably changes the results. The conditioning 
effect on the manufacturing share of GDP dissipates, which disconfirms hypothesis 2 for the 
sample of traditional welfare states. The effect of inequality on the real exchange rate, however, 
becomes highly significant for both models. As such, I conclude that inequality affects the 
spending effect in the traditional welfare states. However, no effect of inequality on wage hikes is 
observed (contrary to the finding for the whole sample), nor is an effect on the manufacturing share 
of employment. All in all, I conclude national political and economic circumstances affect the 
extent of the ameliorating effect of wage coordination and income equality on Dutch disease. 
Pinpointing the specific circumstances that contribute to these differences is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but future research into identifying the causes for these differences is strongly 
encouraged. However, the inclusion of a wider set of countries does not fully explain the 
differences between the results found in Bunte (2017) and in this thesis.  
What remains are the temporal differences between both samples. That is, domestic 
circumstances may have changed throughout the time frames (1970-2000 in Bunte [2017] and 
1995-2014 in this paper), which has led to a diminished effect of wage bargaining centralization 
and inequality on Dutch disease symptoms in recent years. In general, there is some evidence that 
                                                          
13 The regression estimates for these models are available from the author.  
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may support this theory. In the last few decades, developed countries have collectively shifted to 
more service-oriented economies, and have outsourced significant industrial capacity to countries 
with cheaper labor. As such, the importance of resource rents as a predictor of industrial capacity 
may have diminished. In extension, the conditioning effect of centralized wage bargaining and 
inequality on the parameters of Dutch disease (manufacturing performance, real exchange rates, 
wages, and manufacturing employment,) may be expected to have decreased. A quick glance at 
the estimation results seems to confirm this line of reasoning. The estimates for the effects of 
resource rents under the models including wage bargaining centralization seem to confirm the 
presence of Dutch disease mechanics for this sample. Bar model 4, the estimates are all highly 
significant and have the expected direction (a negative effect on manufacturing performance and 
a positive effect on exchange and wage rates).  However, this effect dissipates when controlling 
for inequality (models 5-8). Rather, the extent of inequality becomes the stronger predictor. This 
seems to confirm the notion that resource rents are no longer important predictors of industrial 
capacity, exchange rates and wages. Hence, it seems that the conditioning effects of wage 
bargaining centralization and inequality have become less profound because the importance of 
Dutch disease mechanics in rich countries has diminished over the last few decades.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The relation between natural resource abundance and slowed economic growth has long 
been a subject of economic research. Many theories have been formulated to explain this resource 
‘curse’, but most of these focus on adverse effects in developing countries. One theory that 
attempts to explain the manifestations of the resource curse in developed countries is Dutch 
disease. It finds that windfall resource revenues decrease industrial capacity through the spending 
effect and the resource movement effect. As the manufacturing sector is the engine of economic 
growth, Dutch disease thus leads to long-term growth impediments. However, the effects of 
resource rents on developed countries are not unambiguous; Canada and Australia are suffering 
from Dutch disease, but Norway has used oil-based growth to become one of the richest countries 
in the world. Several authors have sought to explain these differences by extending the Dutch 
disease model to include possible conditioning factors. Bunte (2017) recently made an important 
contribution to this by arguing that wage bargaining centralization and income equality can affect 
of Dutch disease through countering both the spending and resource movement effect. This thesis 
has sought to assess the validity of these claims through making several contributions and 
extensions to the analysis. Most importantly, the sample included a much larger number of 
countries. Moreover, the analysis included more recent data. As such, a panel regression was used 
for 31 countries and 20 years (between 1995 and 2014), and a total of 16 models were tested to 
resemble Bunte’s (2017) analysis, 8 each for inequality and wage coordination. Furthermore, an 
extra dependent variable was used (the manufacturing share of employment) to directly test the 
effects of inequality and wage coordination on the classic Dutch disease model as described by 
Corden and Neary (1982). Finally, the operationalization of several variables differed markedly, 
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most importantly that of the resource rents, which were taken as a share of GDP, rather than as a 
per capita figure.  
The effect of wage coordination was confirmed for only 1 of the 4 parameters of Dutch 
disease. That is, it conditions the upwards force of resource rents on real exchange rates, but 
showed no effect on manufacturing performance, manufacturing employment or wage rates. 
Inequality, on the other hand, has a strong conditioning effect on (manufacturing) wage rates. 
Moreover, the hypotheses for its effect on real exchange rates and manufacturing were tentatively 
confirmed, although the evidence was not overwhelming, and the estimates were insignificant for 
some of the operationalizations of both dependent variables. However, inequality was not found 
to affect manufacturing share of employment. As such, I conclude that the conditioning effect of 
inequality and wage coordination on Dutch disease does not universally hold. It seems more likely 
that the effects found by Bunte (2017) only occur under certain circumstances. Hence, the 
regression equations were estimated again using only the countries studied by Bunte (2017).. 
However, the use of different countries could not fully explain the differences in outcomes. 
Therefore, most likely, the absence of confirmation of these results are due to the more recent data 
used in this paper, rather than the extension of the country sample. In the last decades, industrial 
capacity has moved away from developed countries because of other reasons than Dutch disease. 
As developed countries have become more service-oriented, manufacturing has moved to 
countries with lower labor costs. As such, resource rents may therefore have become less important 
predictors for manufacturing performance in the more developed parts of the world. This notion is 
confirmed by several of the models estimated in this paper, which produce insignificant 
coefficients for resource abundance. All in all, I conclude that wage bargaining centralization and 
inequality are likely to condition Dutch disease somewhat, but not as much as proposed by Bunte 
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(2017). Furthermore, it is likely that these variables will become less important predictors of the 
extent of the Dutch disease if the manufacturing capacity of developed countries continues to shift 
to countries with lower labor costs.   
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